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INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE?
Gary Gutting
Philosophy vs. Science, Continental vs. Analytic
The subdiscipline we call ''philosophy of science'' originated in the nineteenth century in the wake of Kant's critical philosophy. It derives from the challenge posed by modern science to the very idea of a distinctively philosophical enterprise. The ''scientific'' achievements of Galileo, Descartes, and Newton realized long-sought philosophical goals of answering fundamental questions about the nature of planetary and terrestrial motions. Over the next two centuries, however, it became apparent that the empirical methods that produced the seventeenth-century revolution could and should be separated from the a priori methods of traditional philosophy; and the question gradually arose of what, if anything, there remained for philosophy to do. This question became entirely explicit with Kant and has continued to be at the center of the philosophical enterprise ever since. As a rough but useful categorization of philosophies of science I propose distinguishing three basic attitudes to scientific knowledge. The first, which I will call empiricist or positivist, regards science as the only knowledge worthy of the name. Philosophy is at best a metareflection that makes explicit the conclusions of science and the methods whereby it has produced them. The second, Kantian or critical, attitude is that science provides the only first-order knowledge, while philosophy reveals a distinctive domain of truth by deriving the necessary conditions for the possibility of scientific knowledge. The justification of philosophical claims requires the assumption of the validity of science, but the claims themselves (unlike those of positivist philosophy of science) constitute a domain of ''transcendental'' truth that is of a different order than that of science. The third, ontological or metaphysical, attitude claims access to a domain of philosophical truth that is entirely independent of (and, indeed, in some sense superior to) science. This autonomous philosophical truth provides a more general, more fundamental, or more concrete vision of reality, of which science is just one subordinate part and in terms of which it must be understood.
The positivist attitude is typically found among reflective scientists and philosophers deeply involved in science. The most famous proponents were (in Germany) Ernst
